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This paper seeks to move beyond the general base-level of violence that is regularly 
present in cartel politics in order to understand the specific causal mechanisms behind dramatic 
surges of cartel related violence. With violence as the dependent variable, this study identifies 
two prominent theories that seek to explain cartel violence, and tests their independent variables 
against empirical evidence. By using a longitudinal comparative analysis, this paper tested 
whether the unconditional state repression of cartel activity or the end of a state-sponsored 
protection bracket resulted in a surge in cartel violence. Based on homicides per 100,000 
inhabitants as well as the distinct analysis of cartel-state conflict from inter- and intra- cartel 
violence, this paper finds a strong causal connection between unconditional state repression and 
increased cartel violence. This paper additionally finds that while the breaking of patron-client 
ties may foster an environment that is especially prone to violence, it is not sufficient to cause a 
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INTRODUCTION	
 
 Mexican drug cartels1 immediately evoke sensationalist images for many United States 
citizens: tattooed men armed with machine guns guarding huge piles of cocaine and cash, secret 
tunnels sneaking under the US-Mexican border, gruesome gang killings and political 
assassinations, and a failing state that is overrun with violent gangs. The sensationalism of these 
images speaks to the brazen nature of the violence in Mexico, and to the shocking increase in 
cartel-related homicides in recent years. The connection between cartels and violence is obvious, 
on some levels: illegal activities are almost always associated with some degree of violence, due 
to the fact that when disputes can not be solved within a court of law, they must turn to extra-
legal methods, such as violence, in order to resolve any disagreements. This paper is interested in 
the other levels of violence that are associated with cartels, and seeks to move beyond the 
general base-level of violence that is regularly present in cartel politics in order to understand the 
specific causal mechanisms behind dramatic surges of cartel related violence. This study 
identifies violence as the dependent variable, and will utilize various independent variables (such 
as the conditionality of state repression and democratization,) to test different theories against 
evidence, in order to identify which theories most effectively explain the recent spikes in 
Mexican cartel violence. 
 It is important at the outset of this paper to clarify what is meant by the term ‘violence’, 
especially in regard to the particular types of violence occurring in Mexico. Firstly, this paper 
assumes that both individuals and groups engage in violence rationally and strategically, rather 
than impulsively or as a result of passion. The political science standard for measuring rates of 
                                                
1 The use of the word “cartel” in this paper is not referring to the very specific economic term that 
describes a group of actors who have mutually agreed to restrict competition and maintain high prices, 
nor should it suggest that the cartels I am discussing fit that economic model. Rather, this paper favors the 
term cartel because it is used extensively in the literature on this topic. Additionally, this paper uses terms 
such as “cartel” and “drug-trafficking organization” interchangeably. 
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violence is to track the homicides per 100,000 inhabitants of any given area. However, the 
standard measurement is unable to capture the nuanced complexity of violence in Mexico, and 
this paper argues that the key to understanding the recent increases in cartel violence is hidden 
within those complexities. This requires measuring not only the homicides per 100,000 
inhabitants, but also what proportion of those homicides are representatives of the state, such as 
political figures, policemen, journalists, and members of the military, which provides a metric 
for ‘anti-state’ violence. An additional layer of complexity lies in distinguishing between 
different ‘types’ of violence, which can include whether the bodies were tortured or 
dismembered, and whether the homicides were intended to be high- or low-profile killings. It is 
relevant to the scope and goals of this paper to discuss at the outset that this paper seeks to 
understand violence not only in terms of how many where, and when but also in terms of who 
and how. It is only through recognizing the nuanced dimensions of violence and by examining 
the underlying data behind statistics that we can begin to dissect the puzzle of what causes cartel 
violence.  
 This paper will begin by providing the reader with contextual information, including a 
brief history of Mexican politics and a discussion of cartel actors. Following this section, there 
will be a discussion of key definitions, data sources, and methodology. The next section will be 
the literature review, which will identify and explicate two theories that attempt to explain cartel 
violence, as well as briefly speaking to how studies of cartels and studies of violence fit into the 
broader field of political science. After the literature review, this paper will present an evidence 
section that compiles many months of research on the specific causes of cartel violence. The 
penultimate section of this paper will be the results, which will use the research and data 
presented in the evidence section to determine which of the theories presented in the literature 
  Pargiter 8 
review most effectively explain cartel violence. Lastly, the conclusion will feature a discussion 
of how the results fit into the broader picture, how this paper could be expanded, and potential 
policy recommendations.   
STATEMENT	OF	SIGNIFICANCE	
The significance of this case is difficult to understate. Depending on the source, 45,000-
80,000 people were killed in connection with organized crime in Mexico between 2006-2012. 
This number far exceeds the 1,000 battle deaths per year that is commonly used as a metric in 
determining whether or not a conflict is truly a ‘war’.2 The Mexican conflict, then, appears to be 
just as violent as many wars, yet it is considered a war only colloquially – the “Drug War” or 
“Calderón’s War on Drugs” – and not officially. However, the sheer scale of violence in Mexico 
is only one aspect of the puzzle, and it is coupled with the ambiguity of the motives that are 
fueling the violence. If cartels are motivated purely by profit, then surely it would be in their 
interest to conduct illegal business in a more clandestine fashion, without attracting the attention 
of the government through violent battles? If there is more to the story than profits, then we open 
up a realm of open-ended questions with potentially much larger security implications. Unlike 
insurgents and terrorists, criminal groups usually fight in order to preserve the status quo – if 
cartels in Mexico are able to successfully halt the progress of democracy by unleashing a wave 
of violence, how will Mexico ever develop into a consolidated and pluralistic democracy? These 
questions far exceed the scope of this paper, but they are suggestive of what is at stake in this 
conflict, and at the lack of a cohesive response from the political science community.  
                                                
2 Molzahn, Ferreria and Shirk 2013; J. S. Beittel, Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking 
Organizations 2015 
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BACKGROUND	INFORMATION 
HISTORICAL	CONTEXT	
In the 1930s, the PRI was beginning to consolidate its power, and cartels were gaining 
momentum in response to US alcohol prohibition, which was threatening the authority of the 
newly established regime. The government and the cartels created an informal pact to ensure 
stability and preserve the government’s reputation and public order. This pact was explicitly 
described by former governors like Ricardo Monreal, and featured ten guiding principles, such 
as: no dead people in the streets; no public scandals; no deals with other branches of government 
or bureaucracy; mistakes are to be punished with imprisonment, not death; order and respect for 
one another’s territories.3 Throughout the PRI’s nearly 70-year rule, the government and the 
cartels operated with a sense of mutual understanding, and the cartels that violated the pact were 
suppressed and put out of business, while those who respected the pact were able to conduct their 
business without government interference.4  
The PRI is often remembered benevolently as ‘the perfect dictatorship’. Through regular 
elections and the incorporation of diverse constituents into its party structure, such as workers, 
peasants, businessmen, intellectuals, and the military, the PRI was seen by many to embody the 
democratic ideals of the Mexican revolution.5 The pact mentioned above is worthy of further 
discussion here, as the mechanisms behind the pact permeated the PRI’s entire system. Due to 
the PRI’s monopoly on power and its centralized enforcement system, it was able to create a 
state-sponsored protection racket, which can be defined as an “informal institution through 
which public officials refrain from enforcing the law…in exchange for a share of the profits 
                                                
3 Contreras 2012, 74 
4 Ibid. 
5 O'Neil 2009 
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generated by the organization.”6 The quid pro quo corruption of the PRI was not limited to the 
state’s interaction with cartels, but penetrated and managed “most aspects of Mexican social and 
economic life”, including which businesses would succeed and fail, or which students would 
attend which universities.7 The PRI was able to essentially guarantee stability and peace through 
its extensive system of corruption and protection rackets, which many scholars have labeled the 
pax priista, or the PRI peace.  
During the 1970s and 80s, Mexico served as a transit point for the trafficking of cocaine 
by the Colombian cartels to the US, and the Mexican cartels profited and grew as a result, while 
still respecting their pact with the government.8 In the 1990s, there were three key changes that 
affected the Mexican cartels. First, in response to the increased flow of cocaine into the US, the 
US government effectively shut down the Caribbean transport routes that the Colombian cartels 
relied on, forcing the Colombian cartels to rely exclusively on Mexican cartels. This shift 
dramatically increased the amount of cocaine being transported through Mexico, which increased 
the value of the Mexico-US border crossings. Because the Mexican cartels controlled the border 
crossings, the profit margins, size, and firepower of the cartels increased drastically.9  
 The second key change was the slow crumbling of the PRI’s hold on power, which began 
with popular protests in the early 1990s, followed by heavy losses in parliament in 1997, and 
finally, the loss of the presidency in 2000.10 This ended the pax priista, and the PAN gained 
control of the political system. With the end of the pact system and the end of the clientelism that 
defined the PRI’s rule, the incentives for cartels to operate peacefully and respectfully 
disappeared. Beyond disincentivizing peace for the cartels that had co-existed with the PRI 
                                                
6 Snyder and Duran-Martinez 2009 
7 Lessing, The Logic of Violence in Criminal War 2012 
8 Molzahn, Ferreria and Shirk 2013, Henley, Shirk and Molzahn 2015 
9 Lessing, The Logic of Violence in Criminal War 2012, 97 
10 British Broadcasting Service (BBC) 2016 
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government, the end of the pact system also opened the arena to all of the violent would-be 
cartels that had been put out of business under the pact system.11  
Third, the state increased the militarization of their anti-narcotics teams in the mid 1990s. 
While the militarization of anti-narcotics teams may not have been disastrous in another context, 
the structural features of the Mexican state (such as the high incidences of corruption, the weak 
institutional control across Mexico, and the enormous profit opportunities for cartels,) created a 
situation in which it was not difficult for cartels to capture state weapons, and indeed, state 
militias, and use them for their own purposes.12 The increased militarization of state forces thus 
created a security dilemma between the state and the cartels that dramatically increased the 
number and caliber of the weapons involved, heightening the deathly potential of violence. 
Additionally, the end of the PRI’s rule produced incentives for cartels to arm themselves and 
create private protection armies, as the government’s could no longer provide protection to the 
cartels.13   
 2006 marked the beginning of Calderón’s presidency, which is widely referred to as the 
war on drugs. Government policy regarding anti-narcotics efforts became significantly more 




In order to understand why Mexican cartels engage in violence, this paper will compare 
three different time periods of Mexican history that span four presidential terms. Phase 1 spans 
                                                
11 Snyder and Duran-Martinez 2009 
12 Lessing, When Business Gets Bloody: State Policy and Drug Violence 2012 
13 Contreras 2012, 99 
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1988-2000 and covers the PRI presidents Carlos Salinas (1988-1994) and Ernesto Zedillo (1994-
2000). Phase 2 spans 2000-2006, and covers the presidency of Vincente Fox who was the first 
democratically elected president in 70 years. Phase 3 spans 2006-2012, which covers Calderón’s 
term in office and includes the highest rates of cartel violence. By tracking the rate of cartel-
related violence over these time periods and comparing the increases in violence to changes in 
government policy, this paper will attempt to explain the causes behind cartel related violence. 
CASE	SELECTION	
 This paper uses Mexico as a single case study for a number of reasons: I have travelled 
extensively in Mexico and have always been interested in Mexican politics and culture, and I am 
dissatisfied with many of the explanations for increased cartel violence that I have read. While 
other Central American countries have even higher rates of gang violence than Mexico, I was 
more familiar with Mexican history and culture. Additionally, the US-Mexico border and the 
security implications of that border add a layer of complexity to an already complex puzzle. 
DATA	
 Finding accurate data about cartel violence in Mexico is particularly difficult. Mexico has 
an extremely high degree of criminal impunity, with less than 25% of crimes being reported, and 
only 2% of crimes being punished.14 While many believe that homicides are more widely 
reported than other violent crimes, mostly because they are difficult to hide, the discovery of 
multiple mass burial sites over the past few years has complicated this issue.  
There is no data source that is agreed upon by scholars as a complete, consistent, or 
accurate source on violent crimes in Mexico. Some point to the autonomous government 
statistics agency, the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), which releases data 
                                                
14 Molzahn, Ferreria and Shirk 2013 
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on death by homicide, or to the National Public Security System, (SNSP), which reports data on 
cases that are identified by law enforcement, as reliable sources of information. Others doubt the 
government’s reliability, pointing to high Mexican corruption rates, the lubricating power of 
bribes, and the threatening power of violence. Those who doubt the government point to the 
many institutions and journalists who have filed numerous formal “access to information” 
requests to the Mexican government, only to be denied. An additional issue with the data from 
INEGI and SNSP is that neither source distinguishes whether homicides are connected to cartel 
violence. In an attempt to supplement the official data, I have turned to other sources that are 
highly regarded within the field. These sources include media organizations, such as Reforma, a 
Mexico City based newspaper; blogs, such as Borderland Beat; Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) Reports, and special reports prepared by the Trans-Border Institute for the Justice in 
Mexico Project.   
 One major challenge to my research was that many sources do not report on issues until 
they are precisely that, issues. This makes it incredibly difficult to create a research project that 
relies on the comparison of rates of violence within different segments of time with the intention 
of showing a time before violence. For example, CRS reports prior to 2007 cover Latin America 
generally, with no specific mention of violence in Mexico, and only begin releasing Mexico-
specific reports in 2007. The Justice in Mexico Project was created in response to the violence, 
and only began releasing reports in 2003. Additionally, the INEGI was only founded in 1983 and 
did not release annual reports until the mid 1990s, which is when the SNSP was founded. Due to 
the limited data on pre-2000 Mexico, this paper relies on the reports and literature of many 
scholars in order to supplement the lack of raw data. 
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LITERATURE	REVIEW	
 
 The study of organized crime violence, especially of cartel violence in Latin America, is 
a relatively new and growing field. For many years, the study of cartel conflicts fell “largely 
between the cracks of three more familiar social science concepts and their related strands of 
literature: civil war, interest-group politics, and criminal violence,” but the increase in cartel 
conflicts across Latin America over the past 40 years has attracted new interest to the field.15 The 
political science community agrees on many of the general features that facilitate cartel violence, 
(such as low institutional control, high rates of corruption, major income inequality,) but 
resolutely disagree on many of the specific factors that cause cartel violence. This section will 
present two distinct theories that seek to explain the causes of increased cartel violence.  
THEORY	1	
 This theory16 uses the conditionality of repression as its independent variable and 
identifies cartel-related violence as its dependent variable. Conditional repression can be thought 
of as proportional repression, through which the government represses cartel activity in direct 
proportion to how violent the cartel is; whereas unconditional repression can be thought of as a 
blanket crackdown, in which the government represses all cartels, regardless of how violent they 
are. Lessing argues that under conditional repression models, cartels are incentivized to engage 
with the state and one another peacefully in order to avoid increased repression. Conversely, 
under unconditional repression, Lessing identifies two distinct causal chains which each identify 
unconditional repression as a cause of increased cartel violence, through distinct intermediary 
variables. We will label these two causal chains Hypothesis 1A and Hypothesis 1B.  
                                                
15 Lessing, The Logic of Violence in Criminal War 2012, 16 
16 This theory relies almost exclusively on Lessing and Osario’s doctoral dissertations for its formulation. 
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In Hypothesis 1A, Lessing argues that unconditional repression encourages anti-state 
violence. Under unconditional repression, it is more difficult for all cartels to conduct business. 
In this environment, cartels become more desperate to conduct business effectively, which 
enables corrupt enforcers, such as policemen or judges, to demand higher bribes. Eventually, this 
environment becomes too expensive for the cartels to continue paying the high bribe prices, so 
they turn to violence in order to reduce the bribe price and restore the balance of power. By using 
violence strategically, cartels are able to threaten corrupt enforcers and convince them to reduce 
the bribe price, which reestablishes an environment in which the cartels can afford to do 
business. If Hypothesis 1A was true, we would expect to see an increase in anti-state violence 
directly following the implementation of policies that involve unconditional repression.  
In Hypothesis 1B, Lessing argues that unconditional repression causes cartels to fragment 
into smaller cartels, which exacerbates turf wars and results in higher incidences of intra-cartel 
and inter-cartel violence. This effect is especially powerful when coupled with a “kingpin 
strategy”, which triggers succession battles within cartels. The explanation of how unconditional 
repression causes an increase in turf war violence relies on the manner in which law enforcement 
affects the relative military equilibrium between cartels: by cracking down on any one cartel, that 
cartel’s ability to protect its territory is weakened, which stimulates the territorial expansion of a 
rival cartel. As long as cartels have enough military and economic strength to recover from those 
attacks, they have a profit-based incentive to continue fighting for control of those territories. 
“Consequently, when the state simultaneously fights several criminal organizations within its 
territory, it generates a Hobbesian war of all against all.”17 Lessing identifies narco-messaging18  
as a reputation building and flag-planting strategy that is used during turf wars.  
                                                
17 Osorio 2013, 5 
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If Hypothesis 1B is true, we would expect to see an increase in general cartel-related 
violence, especially inter- and intra- cartel homicides and increased incidences of narco-
messages directly following the implementation of policies that involve unconditional 
repression. Additionally, we would expect to see regional surges of inter-cartel violence 
immediately following kingpin arrests or deaths.  
Hypothesis 1A and Hypothesis 1B work in tandem with one another to formulate Theory 
1, and each establish different causal chains through which unconditional repression can lead to 
increased incidences of cartel violence. 
THEORY	2	
 Theory 2 identifies democratization as the primary cause of the recent surge in cartel-
related violence. Theory 2 is only applicable to cases with certain structural conditions, which 
Mexico fits. When a state has a long-standing autocracy with centralized control, and that state 
creates state-sponsored protection brackets for criminal groups, then Theory 2 proposes that 
increased electoral competition (democratization) is correlated with increased rates of cartel 
related violence.19  
This theory proposes that democratization leads to increased cartel violence because of 
the break of patron-client relationships and the political opening that occurs when those 
relationships break. When increased electoral competition causes a break in patron-client 
relationships, cartels are incentivized to a) create their own protection armies, b) negotiate with 
the new political establishment, often using coercive violence, c) bid for new market 
opportunities and establish a new power dynamic with the government in an effort to gain more 
                                                                                                                                                       
18 Narco-messaging describes the public messages left by cartels, often addressed to the state or to rival 
gangs. The more gruesome versions of these messages are attached to mutilated or dismembered bodies. 
For a more detailed description, see Martin 2012. 
19 Osorio 2013; Contreras 2012 
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autonomy.20 If Theory 2 is true, we would expect to see a spike in cartel related violence directly 
after highly competitive elections or a switch in the ruling party. It is especially useful to trace 
this on not only a national level, but also a regional level by observing elections of governors in 
Mexican states. While this theory may seem similar to Hypothesis 1A, their causal chains differ 
in the order of variables. In Hypothesis 1A, it is specifically the unconditional crackdown that 
causes a violent bidding process and an attempt to establish cartel autonomy; whereas in Theory 
2 it is the political opening that leads to a violent bidding process and an attempt to establish 




 Phase 1 covers the last two presidential terms of the PRI’s 71-year long dictatorship, and 
includes the presidential terms of Carlos Salinas (1988-1994) and of Ernesto Zedillo (1994-
2000). In the early 1990’s, the PRI’s hegemonic, centralized system began to unravel, with 
Salinas’ election in 1998 being the first presidential election in which the PRI faced significant 
opposition from the left since the beginning of their rule in 1929. Shortly after Salinas was 
elected, the PRI lost control of its first governorship, with the PAN winning Baja California’s 
state election in 1989. The transition of power in Baja California only motivated political 
opposition, and Salinas implemented major political reforms that began to open up the political 
system. 
                                                
20 O'Neil 2009 
  Pargiter 18 
 Under Salinas, the Mexican Attorney’s General Office (PGR) initiated a series of reforms 
that were designed to reduce corruption. These reforms shortened the time horizons of state 
officials and increased the rotation of public officials, resulting in increased turnover and purges 
of entire units.21 One major reform that was overseen by Salinas was the move for each Attorney 
General to appoint a new team of collaborators when they entered office, which created turnover 
and uncertainty within the staff of the Attorney General. All of these reforms undercut the state’s 
ability to operate a protection bracket for the cartels, as they targeted corrupt enforcers, increased 
uncertainty about the length and location of any public official’s appointment, and opened the 
political system to opposition parties.  
 The 1994 election of Zedillo was even more contested than that of Salinas, as the PRI’s 
first candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio, was assassinated shortly after he began his campaign for 
presidency. With only four months until the election, the PRI turned to Zedillo, who won the 
election narrowly, by 48.69%. Zedillo continued with Salinas’ political reforms, and initiated 
electoral reform that decreased the influence of the PRI by altering the composition of the senate 
and strengthening proportional representation.22 The PGR’s reforms continued under Zedillo, 
with the 1996 creation of new Assistant Attorney General positions that decentralized the PGR’s 
control and emphasized the autonomy of subnational governments, rather than a single, federal 
office. In 1997, the PAN took advantage of Zedillo’s electoral reforms and gained a majority of 
the senate. Between 1992 and 2000, the PAN and the PRD won a series of gubernatorial 
positions, which seriously undermined the PRI’s monopoly on power.23  
The effect of the increased electoral competition of the 1990s was compounded by the 
decentralizing reforms of the PRG, which fundamentally altered the ability of the state to offer a 
                                                
21 Snyder and Duran-Martinez 2009, 263 
22 Weldon 1996 
23 Klesner 1997 
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protection bracket, and created a system with multiple sets of geographically dispersed and semi-
autonomous enforcers. The switch from a single enforcer to a net of many enforcers made it 
more challenging for cartels to bribe authorities, in part because it was more difficult to 
determine exactly who to bribe, and also because it increased the overall number of individuals 
who needed to be bribed, which increased the cost of bribing authorities. 
In summary, the government underwent a slow political opening during Phase 1, 
including the gradual dismantling of the PRI system of clientelism and the decentralization of 
government enforcement agencies. The political reforms implemented under Salinas and Zedillo 
made it possible for Fox, the first PAN president, to win in the 2000 elections. While Salinas and 
Zedillo each made implemented reforms that reduced government corruption, neither president 
specifically targeted cartels or made any significant moves towards repressing cartel business 
opportunities. However, the patron-client relationship between the cartels and state that had 
defined so much of the PRI’s rule came to an end during Phase 1, initially being weakened at a 
regional level and ultimately at a national level in 2000 when the office of the president 
transferred parties. If Theory 1 is correct, there should be no significant increase in violence 
during Phase 1, as there was no blanket crackdown on cartels or kingpin strategy. If Theory 2 is 
correct, there should be spikes in violence throughout the 1990s to reflect the increased electoral 
competition occurring in gubernatorial elections; as well as an increase in violence following the 
breakdown of the pax priista.  
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VIOLENCE	
 The overall trend of cartel related violence, as measured by total homicides, decreased 
during Phase 1. At its peak in 1992, INEGI reported 16,594 homicides, which declined to 10,232 
reported homicides in 2000.24  
 There were some regional spikes in violence, though they were fairly small. After the 
leader of the Juárez cartel died in 1997 while undergoing plastic surgery, the Tijuana and Sinaloa 
cartels fought for control of Juárez’s territory until 1999, when the Juárez cartel regrouped 
around a new leader.25 There were some political assassinations surrounding the 1994 elections, 
but no one has been able to establish any connection to the cartels. The fights between cartels in 
Phase 1 were more similar to skirmishes than battles, and both the nation-wide homicide rate and 
the regional homicide rates declined continuously over these 12 years.  
The trend with the most significant implications for cartel related violence in Phase 1 was 
the increased militarization of both cartels and anti-narcotics efforts, which did not directly affect 
rates of violence in Phase 1, but set the stage for Phase 2: Due to the increased uncertainty 
surrounding the positions of public officials, the state-sponsored protection bracket began to 
weaken, which motivated the cartels to seek their own protection through increased 
militarization and the creation of paramilitary style protection gangs within the cartel. The 
creation of The Zetas reveals how violent the militarization of cartels can be, with most sources 
indicating that the Zetas were created in the late 1990s by the Gulf cartel, and were comprised of 
30 lieutenants and sublieutenants who deserted from a Special Forces unit of the Mexican 
military. The Zetas served as a private military for the Gulf cartel, and were able to carry out 
much more sophisticated operations than other protection gangs. The Zetas became infamous 
                                                
24 Molzahn, Ferreria and Shirk 2013, 12 
25 O'Neil 2009, 68 
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throughout Mexico and Central America as one of the most brutal and violent groups that 
existed, and their advanced weaponry escalated the conflict as a whole to a new level, forcing 
rival cartels to enhance their own protection gangs.26 
PHASE	2	(2000-2006)	
STATE	ACTIONS	
 Vicente Fox’s 2000 election shifted Mexico closer to democratic political system, and 
Fox faced a lot of pressure to ensure that the democratic ideals of the people were realized. Fox 
believed that under a more democratic system the government should reduce its internal security 
spending and purge the corruption that had defined Mexican politics for so long. However, 
strong opposition from the US drug administration forced Fox to reconsider his position on 
reducing military involvement.27 Fox launched Operation Secure Mexico, which was designed to 
crackdown on cartel violence while also reducing corruption within state forces, in June 2005.28  
 There were four major cartels during Fox’s presidency, including the Gulf cartel, the 
Tijuana cartel, the Sinaloa cartel, and the Juárez cartel; all of which underwent major changes 
during those six years.29 While some critiqued Fox for not doing more to fight cartels, those 
critiques came after Calderón’s extremely aggressive approach, and it is important to note how 
much Fox’s approach departed from his predecessors. This was evidenced by the increase in 
drug seizures under Fox and the wave of major cartel leaders who were extradited to the US.30 
These cartel leaders included Osiel Cárdenas, the head of the Gulf cartel, who was arrested in 
2002. Multiple leaders of the Tijuana cartel were also captured through joint Mexican and US 
                                                
26 Cook 2007; Molzahn, Ferreria and Shirk 2013 
27 Lessing, The Logic of Violence in Criminal War 2012, 98 
28 Cook 2007, 10 
29 Ibid., 2 
30 J. S. Beittel, Mexico's Drug Related Violence 2009 
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enforcement efforts in the early 2000s, including the 2002 capture of Benjamin Arellano Felix, 
the leader of the cartel.31 Under Fox’s presidency, the Mexican government “arrested over 
79,000 people on charges related to drug trafficking,” including 15 cartel leaders, 74 lieutenants, 
53 financial officers, 428 hitmen, and over 78,000 low level drug dealers.32 
 The high rates of arrests, seizures, and extraditions under Fox led to major 
reconfigurations within internal cartel structures, and caused the four major cartels to form new 
alliances with one another. Cárdenas and Arellano Felix, the leaders of the Gulf and Tijuana 
cartels respectively, formed an alliance while imprisoned together against the Federation 
Alliance, which was formed by the Sinaloa and Juárez cartels. The changes within cartel 
organization and the shifting lines of demand further destabilized the already severely damaged 
protection racket, because it made it more difficult for corrupt state enforcers to rely on cartels as 
stable partners, while also undermining the ability of cartels to send “credible signals to 
officials…that they could be trusted to deliver on their promises.”33 
 Whether or not Fox’s policies can be though of as unconditionally repressive is 
complicated. Fox’s approach to cartel repression was certainly less conditional than his 
predecessors, but this paper argues that it cannot be truly thought of as a blanket crackdown on 
cartels, even though Fox argued that it was. Mexico’s long history of high-level collusion 
between the state and traffickers has many examples of crackdowns, seizures, extraditions, and 
killings of one cartel being pre-negotiated between the state and a rival cartel. While there is no 
proof that this occurred under Fox, many scholars speculate that it did. Examples of this include 
the 2001 prison escape of the Sinaloa leader “El Chapo” Guzmán, as well as the heavy 
deployment of troops to Nuevo Laredo in 2005, where they violently repressed Gulf cartel 
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activity. These examples have been cited as evidence that Fox favored the Sinaloa cartel and was 
helping them expand their territory against the Gulf cartel, which exemplifies the conditional 
nature of cartel repression under Fox.34 
 The government policies during Phase 2 can largely be thought of as setting the 
groundwork for the incredibly aggressive war against drugs that occurs in Phase 3.  Fox’s 
presidency oversaw major efforts at purging corruption from the state’s military and police 
forces, though how successful those purges were remains hotly contested. There were more 
arrests and extraditions of drug traffickers and more seizures of drugs and weapons under Fox 
than there were by any of his predecessors, which stimulated major shifts in cartel organization. 
While there were succession battles and turf wars, as will be discussed below, there was minimal 
cartel fragmentation under Fox’s regime. The protection bracket continued to deteriorate under 
Fox, as the increased repression by the state, the change in ruling party, and the corruption 
purges of the state all made it difficult for either corrupt enforcers or cartels to properly engage 
in a patron-client relationship.   
If Hypothesis 1 is true, we would not expect to see higher levels of state-cartel conflict, 
cartel fragmentation, or inter- and intra- cartel conflict than in Phase 1, though we might expect 
to see regional surges of violence in response to kingpins being arrested or killed. If Theory 2 is 
true, we would expect to see much higher rates of cartel violence in Phase 2 than in Phase 1, due 
to the massive corruption purges and the inability of a state-sponsored protection bracket to 
function.    
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VIOLENCE	
INEGI and SNSP report a generally declining number of total homicides over the course 
of Phase 2, but when supplemented with data from Reforma and reports by the Justice in Mexico 
Project, we can see a gradual increase in cartel related homicides over the course of 2002. 
According to these additional data sources, cartel-related homicides per year roughly doubled 
over the course of Phase 2, from approximately 1,000 homicides in 2000 to 2,000 homicides in 
2006, with the rate of violence increasing after 2005.35  
In 2004, fighting broke out between the Gulf and Sinaloa cartels over territory. Each 
cartel was backed by their own protection gang: the Gulf cartel by the Zetas and the Sinaloa 
cartel by Los Negros. This was one of the first examples of how cartels would begin to operate 
with increased militarization, and featured daytime shootout in the middle of urban areas and a 
wave of violent clashes. While this turf war fueled public terror and fear, it did not contribute 
hugely to the national death toll.36  
The first clashes between the state and the cartels began under Fox, with fights breaking 
out in Nuevo Laredo between cartels and polices forces, as well as fights between municipal 
police (who were likely employed by the cartels,) and federal troops.37 Within the first month of 
Operation Secure Mexico being launched in June 2005, there were multiple fights between the 
federal and municipal police. In Nuevo Laredo, municipal police fired on federal police forces, 
which resulted in the arrest of 41 municipal police and a corruption investigation of the entire 
700-member police department, with less than half of them being cleared to return to duty. Later 
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in the month, federal police forces rescued 44 civilians who were allegedly kidnapped by the 
municipal police force.38 This is one of the few examples of cartel-state conflict in Phase 2. 
PHASE	3	(2006-2012)	
STATE	ACTIONS	
 As alluded to throughout this paper, Calderón identified the war against drugs as the 
primary goal of his presidency, and began aggressively repressing cartel activity as soon as he 
entered office. Part of the reason that Calderón took such a dramatic stance on cartels was 
because of the precariousness of his position. He won the 2006 election by extremely narrow 
margins (.58%), and faced public and political protestors for months after the election, forcing 
him to establish “the legitimacy of his presidency quickly and decisively.”39 A few weeks into 
his presidency, Calderón met with top security officials to design a military strategy that would 
target the leaders of cartels and reduce the dominant cartels into smaller, less powerful criminal 
organizations. Calderón spoke so publically and forcefully about his plan to destroy the cartels 
that any retreat would have ended his political career: the war against cartels became personally 
associated with Calderón and with his presidency.40  
 Calderón’s strategy was unconditional in its repression, and promised to pursue the 
cartels with “no distinction.”41 When he was accused of favoring the Sinaloa cartel, Calderón 
insisted that cartels were being “attacked in a manner proportional to their size”.42 While this 
remark may have signaled to the public that Calderón was being fair, it signaled to the cartels 
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that the “repression would not be conditional on their behavior.” 43 This signaling provided 
cartels with “no reason to believe that by eschewing violence they could reduce the amount of 
state repression they were exposed to”, and effectively removed any remaining incentives for 
cartels to conduct their business peacefully.44 The pax priista system was long gone. 
Calderón focused all of the state’s resources into his war against the cartels, and 
increased the state’s offensive on all fronts. Over the course of his presidency, Calderón 
allocated more and more funds to the security sector agencies, increasing the budget from 
84,975.0 in 2007 to 126,128.9 in 2011.45 These budget increases helped expand the federal 
police force from 6,500 at the beginning of Calderón’s term to 37,000 by 2012. In an effort to 
prevent police and military forces from being bought by the cartels, Calderón increased the 
salaries of all anti-cartel units by 50%; as well as trying to centralize the federal police force by 
subordinating multiple divisions under one commander.46 Calderón’s presidency continued the 
purging efforts of Fox, and fired 284 federal police commanders in June 2007, who included 
representatives from all 31 states.47 
Eduardo Guerrero-Gutiérrez conducted an extensive study on Calderón’s kingpin strategy 
for the North American Forum, which traced the kingpins who were killed or arrested and the 
regional impact on levels of violence that those kills or arrests had. Guerrero-Gutiérrez identified 
a total of 28 cartel leaders who were killed or arrested between 2007 and 2011, with 17 of those 
cartel leaders being actual kingpins.48 The combined effect of Calderón’s unconditional 
repression and his kingpin strategy was a major splintering of the cartels. When Calderón’s term 
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began, there were 4-6 dominant cartels, and by the time he left office in 2012, there were at least 
12 major cartels operating over significant territories in Mexico. The number of smaller 
paramilitary style gangs also increased, with 5 in 2007 and sixty-two by 2010, many of which 
had broken off from large cartels.49  The remarkable increase in the number of cartels, as caused 
through fragmentation, is evident when comparing Figures 1 and 2.  
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Figure 2: 2013 DEA Map of Cartel Influence51 
 
 
In summary, Calderón’s presidency was defined by his aggressive and unconditional 
repression of cartel activity. This repression resulted in a major splintering of cartels into smaller 
organizations, as well as the removal of many kingpins. Calderón continued to implement anti-
corruption reforms within the public sector. Phase 3 also featured high electoral competition, 
with Calderón barely winning the presidency in 2006 and the PAN winning back the executive 
office in 2012. Under Calderón, the hegemonic, centralized state-sponsored protection bracket 
was rendered entirely ineffective.  
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If Theory 1 is true, we would expect to see a major spike in state-cartel conflict and in 
general cartel related violence during Phase 3, especially as compared to Phases 1 and 2. We 
would also expect to see fragmentation resulting in turf wars and increased regional violence 
after the arrest or killing of kingpins. If Theory 2 is true, we would expect to see a slight increase 
in cartel related violence in Phase 3 as compared to Phase 2, with both phases having 
significantly higher rates of violence than Phase 1.   
VIOLENCE		
 The spike in cartel related violence in 2006 was, by any metric, explosive. The vast 
majority of the increase in violence was in drug-related homicides, which often took the form of 
“gang-land style executions.”52 However, 2006 also saw a spike in cartel-state conflict, including 
attacks on army soldiers. INEGI reported an increase in homicides under Calderón from 8,867 in 
2007 to 27,213 in 2011, with an average annual increase of 24%.53 Separating how much of this 
violence occurred between cartels and how much occurred between cartels and the state is more 
difficult, and this section will attempt to track the attacks on military and police forces, the 
assassinations of political figures, the fragmentation of cartels and the ensuing turf wars, and the 
effect of kingpin arrests or deaths on conflicts.  
 Lessing establishes a strong correlation between drug and weapon seizures and attacks on 
state forces, and CRS evidence reports this. Not only do the attacks on police and army forces 
follow closely large drug seizures, but the rate at which cocaine seizures by metric tons increases 
over time is almost exactly proportional to the number of attacks on the army by cartels over 
time.54 Because drug seizures can be conceptualized as one aspect of Calderón’s unconditional 
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repression of cartel activity, this connection between unconditional repression and incidences of 
anti-state violence provides remarkably strong support for Hypothesis 1A.  
Between 2006 and 2011, 174 non-police/military public officials were killed, including 
more than 30 mayors.55 The mayors who were killed were primarily in cities near the US-
Mexican boarder, in cities that rated higher in corruption than many other cities in Mexico. 
Lessing attributes this to a process of violent corruption, which supports Theory 1, and explains 
cartel anti-state violence as an effort to restore power equilibriums and reduce bribe prices.56   
Calderón succeeded in his mission to fragment the major cartels into smaller 
organizations, but it did not have the pacifying effect that he intended. As seen in the comparison 
of Figures 1 and 2, there was a huge multiplication of active cartels in Mexico as a result of 
Calderón’s policies, and the huge spike in violence has been attributed in part to the resulting turf 
wars. Part of the reason that the splintering of cartels was so violent can be credited with the 
break off of protection gangs from the cartels who spawned them, such as the 2009 split of The 
Zetas from the Gulf cartel, or the split between the Sinaloa cartel and Los Negros.57 Because the 
protection gangs were literally the paramilitary unit of the cartel as a whole, it makes sense that 
their split from the cartel to establish themselves as an autonomous organization would be 
especially violent, in particular because of the sophisticated violence of the protection gangs and 
how essential they are to overall cartel operations.  
Phase 3 also saw the beginning of narco-messages, which occurred at a rate of higher 
frequency over the six years of Calderón’s presidency. This type of brazen and gruesome 
messaging is used strategically by new cartels to as a reputation building strategy, which they use 
to display their force to other cartels and to bid for new corrupt enforcer relationships. Narco-
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messages can also be used as a flag planting strategy, which occurs when a particular cartel kills 
rival cartel members within its territory and subsequently displays their bodies with messages 
such as “Go Home, Zetas”. Through the flag planting use of narco-messages, cartels are 
signaling to rival gangs and to their own supporters, and reinforcing their ownership of specific 
territory and their willingness to use force to protect that territory.58 The fact that narco-messages 
essentially did not exist before 2006, as well as how much their use increased over the course of 
Phase 3, is a testament to how intense the turf wars were during this time.  
While the death or arrest of kingpins was found to have a positive relationship with 
violence, it was not quite as violent as Theory 1 predicted. Of the 28 cartel leaders who were 
killed or arrested in Guerrero-Gutiérrez’s study, 15 of those, or 53%, lead to a regional increase 
in violence directly afterwards.59  
Phase 3 wittnessed the highest rates of unconditional repression as well as the highest 
rates of cartel-state conflict and of inter- and intra- cartel violence. Included in this was the 
splintering of cartels and the triggering of increased turf wars, the increased extradition of drug 
traffickers to the US, and the increased targeting of kingpins.  
CONCLUSION	
DISCUSSION	OF	RESULTS	
By tracing government policies and cartel related violence over three phases, this paper 
attempted to identify specific political causes of increases in violence, in support of either 
Theory 1 or Theory 2. Electoral competition increased over the course of Phase 1, culminating in 
the presidency of Fox at the beginning of Phase 2. An increase in electoral competition and 
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political opening coincided with the slow dismantling of the state-sponsored protection bracket 
and the pax priista. Kingpins are arrested, extradited, and killed under Phases 2 and 3, but at a 
much higher rate in Phase 3. Unconditional repression of cartel activity began in earnest during 
Phase 3, as did the fragmentation of cartels. General cartel related violence traced over the three 
phases generally declines in Phase 1, gradually doubles in Phase 2, and spikes dramatically in 
Phase 3. In terms of anti-state violence, there are a few examples in Phase 2, and a dramatic 
increase of events in Phase 3. Phase 2 witnesses one serious turf war, whereas Phase 3 is plagued 
with increasingly lethal turf wars and the beginning of narcomessages.  
The evidence suggests a strong correlation between unconditional repression and cartel 
violence, which points to Theory 1 as a better explanation for the mechanisms that cause surges 
in cartel violence. Additionally, Hypothesis 1A and 1B are each supported by the evidence as 
unconditional repression results in both an increase in anti-state violence and an increase in cartel 
fragmentation, turf wars, and narco-messages.  
While there is some support for Theory 2 in the increased militarization of cartels, there 
is too much of a delay in violence after the increased electoral competition and the decrease in 
patron-client relationships, suggesting that while these causes may contribute generally to surges 
in cartel violence, they are not sufficient to cause it on their own. 
STEPS	FORWARD	
 My findings suggest that Mexico should use conditional repression in its fight against 
cartels, as well as strengthening political institutions and reducing corruption. This study would 
benefit from a more exact analysis of regional affects on cartel violence, as well as a study of 
how changes in US-Mexican border enforcement might trigger cartel violence.  
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